Making Nigeria Nuclear Power Programme Feasible
MUCH has been said about the Nigerian
nuclear power (NP) programme. Few
believe the programme would deliver
electricity to Nigeria. Most do not believe
anything would be achieved due to
mismanagement by the focal institution,
the Nigeria Atomic Energy Commission
(NAEC). The Commission was mandated
in 2006 to achieve online electricity
generation from nuclear fuel by 2017.
Going by the current progress this may
not be achieved in another 25 years.
The position of the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA), the global nuclear
watchdog is that “launching a nuclear
power programme is a major
undertaking that requires careful
planning, preparation and investment”.
IAEA is letting new-comer countries
developing NP infrastructure know that
“if wishes were horses, beggars would
ride”, positing that developing national
NP policy must involve broad range of
stakeholders: politicians, policy makers,
technical experts, community and non-
governmental organisations (CBOs and
NGOs), and the general public. These
stakeholders must own the project and
evolve a tailor-made programme with
achievable targets, roles and
responsibilities understood by all. Lack
of such understanding appears the
reason the programme is stalled.
The role of NP Programme in National
Development
NP programmes are associated with high
investment costs, ionizing radiation and
radioactive wastes. Wastes management,
safety and NPP economics remain issues
of public concern. Despite these,
developing countries with successful
programmes have witnessed vertical and
horizontal technological development in
their economies. This is because one
precondition for successful NP
programme is human and institutional
capacity development to support all
elements of the technologies and their
domestication in reasonable time. “In
reasonable time” is underlined in the
last statement because of typical long
duration of the programme. IAEA
recommends a 17-year structured
programme, which would require four
Presidents of four-year tenure or two
presidents with eight-year tenure each in
Nigeria to complete. Periods much longer
than this requires more political players
and runs the risk of failure unless
focused leadership is guaranteed across
the number of years and political
players.
Besides nuclear, other associated
technologies to be domesticated include
construction hardware and materials;
instrumentation technologies; steel, light
and heavy machinery; electro-
mechanical, chemical and allied
technologies; hi-tech welding,
fabrication of inputs to support
operation and repairs for all facets of NP
infrastructure, among others.
Domestication creates the platform for
increasing the fraction of technologies
patented locally that is used in projects.
With time the nation is able to advance
and apply its own patented technologies
in whole NPPs or projects in other
economic sectors.
South Korea whose programme started
just before Nigeria’s independence
commissioned its first turn-key NPP in
1978 with 8% national content. This
grew to 12% and 14% with 2nd and 3rd
turn-key NPPs in 1982 and 1984. They
went into modular NPP constructions
with 79% national content attained in
1995 and finally reached 100% in 2012.
Koreans now builds NPPs at home and
abroad and one of the highest exporters
of high technology goods and services
globally. Achieving 100% indigenisation
34 years after its first turn-key NPP and
53 years after project inception is a
significant feat Nigeria could emulate.
Their economy has witnessed
monumental expansion that is
uncommon. Same is the case in China,
India, Pakistan, South Africa and others
in the NP club.
The Facts and Non-facts of Nuclear Power
Nuclear programmes have become highly
controversial. However, issues are not
factual but fueled by anxieties of World
War II experience. Only a few serious NP
accidents have actually occurred
globally, one at Three Mile Island (1979),
one at Chernobyl (1986); and three at
Fukushima (2011). Most others are
recorded as incidents. The Chernobyl
accident, had more than 4000 fatalities,
and 6 fatalities in 3 incidents in Japan,
most others had zero fatalities. Despite
limited accidents and improvements in
safety many are not convinced that
nuclear power is safe or could be made
safer. Difficulties arise in sieving facts
from non-facts. Nuclear facilities pose
serious danger to the public if not
adequately contained and managed.
However, measures to protect workers
and the public are increasing. NPPs are
not unsafe in comparison with road,
aviation, industrial accidents etc, which
have higher frequency and annual
fatality records.
That the world only witnessed few major
accidents in over 16,000 cumulative
reactor-years of commercial operation in
33 countries in over six decades attests
to its relative safety. Accident risks
remain low and declining. Current
anxieties appear over-magnified and
speculative. Can Nigeria with all its
economic challenges afford to wait until
safety is completely guaranteed before
investing in the sector through
articulated well-structured NP
programme for greater national
economic benefits?
Challenges Associated with Current NAEC
Approach
Of the activities in NAEC road map
document to actualise the NP
infrastructure between 2006 and 2017
only site appraisal and initial training
have been attempted. Both are yet to be
fully realised. Most planned tasks remain
pending. Since appraisal teams visited
proposed sites in 2009, no single follow-
up has been made to any site. Apart
from media reports, the Governments of
States and communities to host NPPs are
yet to be formally briefed to allay fears.
How then and when would specific site
(s) be delineated and mapped to allow
for characterisation and site-specific
NPP design to commence? Failure to
consult with stakeholders to ensure that
they align with the project is a major
discrepancy that could jeopardize the
project if stakeholders decide to reject it.
The slow pace of the NP programme
appears to result from the fact that the
Chairman had set himself apart from the
other Members of the Commission
appointed by the President to work with
him in decision-making. This would
easily create “a house divided against
itself” scenario, which remains a major
risk for the programme and its ability to
achieve its goal. In such situations, there
is a strong likelihood that due processes
in decision-making would not be
followed and in the process, progress,
which reflects the real work, takes a back
seat.
R&D institutions have within this period
not been able to integrate their financial
requirements into the Commission’s
budgets and are highly constrained to
play their role in the Programme. This
raises the challenge on how to actualise
the programme without R&D inputs in
training, infrastructure development,
and domestication, which remains much
slower than expected of a country that
expected commissioning its first NPP in
2017.
The Commission has not formally
articulated any NP financing model(s) to
the President for approval. The adoption
of such framework is a process rather
than decision of an individual. Media
report indicate that Nigeria has adopted
the build, own, operate and transfer
(BOOT) model for its first NPP. The
President may not be availed of the
options and prospects for each financing
option. The project stands the risks of
rejection if the Government does not
understand its role and responsibility
enough in the programme to plan how to
meet them effectively. From Section 3(2)
of NAEC Act, “no policy initiated by the
Commission shall be implemented
without reference to and prior approval
of the President”. It is not clear if the
President is aware of some strong
policies like the financing model
currently “adopted.”
Nigeria has commitments to be made
irrespective of the financing template.
Examples include transport of heavy
equipment to site on arrival at the port,
grid expansion, etc. If some expected
equipment are too heavy for road,
inland waterways (as currently dredged)
or the current rail gauge, further inland
waterways dredging or enhanced rail
gauge to site(s) would be required. Such
investments shall be on the shoulders of
the government and planned a-priori.
Machineries would otherwise remain at
ports until transportation routes are
ready leading to unwarranted delays.
The President is not to be informed. The
buck must stop at him in final decision
and the ownership of the project in line
with NAEC Act.
The Way Forward
Going forward, the time appears right
for the Government to ensure that NAEC
operates as a strong national institution
rather than remain a governmental
individual. Its enabling Law of 1976 is
too old to allow current national
aspirations to be met and hence overdue
for review. This would give the
Commission a new vigour to make the
programme viable and able to bring the
economic transformation the nation
needs in reasonable time. The
programme would only remain feasible
if implemented with full stakeholders’
consultation and ownership. The
President must be adequately consulted
and so must political players, MDAs,
NGOs, CBOs, and labour who must be
partners in its implementation.
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